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The unjust distributional consequences of climate change, and its potentially negative aggregate 
effect on economic growth and welfare are two reasons to be concerned about climate change. Our 
knowledge of the impact of climate change is incomplete. Monetary valuation is difficult and 
controversial. The effect of other developments on the impacts of climate change is largely 
speculative. Nonetheless, it can be shown that poorer countries and people are more vulnerable than 
are richer countries and people. A modest global warming is likely to have a net negative effect on 
poor economics in hot climates, but may have a positive effect on rich economies in temperate 
climates. If one counts dollars, the world aggregate impact may be positive. If one counts people, 
the world aggregate effect is probably negative. For more substantial warming, negative effects 
become more negative, and positive effects turn negative. The marginal costs of carbon dioxide 
emissions are uncertain and sensitive to assumptions that partially reflect ethical and 
methodological positions, but are unlikely to exceed $50 per tonne of carbon. The marginal costs of 
methane emission are likely to be less than $250/tCH4; the marginal costs of nitrous oxide 
emissions are probably lower than $7000/tN2O. Global warming potentials, the official manner to 
trade-off the various greenhouse gases, do not reflect, conceptually or numerically, the real trade-
offs in either a cost-benefit or a cost-effectiveness framework. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change continues to figure prominently as one of the major environmental concerns for the 
future. Some people argue climate change is a problem because it could cause unacceptable 
hardship for particularly vulnerable populations (e.g. those living on small island states). Others are 
concerned about the potential threat to certain unique and valuable systems (such as coral reefs). 
Still others worry that climate change will increase the probability of large-scale climate instabilities 
(e.g., a shutdown of the Gulf Stream), and will have costly impacts on economies through floods 
and storms. A fourth group wonders about the total (or aggregate) impacts of climate change.  They 
argue that emission reduction is costly too, and that abatement costs should be balanced against the 
avoided costs of climate change. The subject of this paper – the marginal costs of climate change – 
provides useful information on all these reasons for concern (Smith et al., 2001), but it particularly 
addresses the need for and problems in calculating aggregate costs of climate change . 
A key challenge when assessing the impacts of climate change is synthesis, i.e., the need to reduce 
the complex pattern of local and individual impacts to a more tractable set of  indicators. The 
challenge is to identify indicators that can summarize and make comparable the impacts in different 
regions, sectors or systems in a meaningful way. Various indicators have been advanced. Many 
models use ‘physical’ measures such as number of people affected (e.g., Hoozemans et al., 1993), 
change total plant growth (White et al., 1999), runoff (Arnell, 1999), number of systems undergoing 
change (e.g., Alcamo et al., 1995), and so on. Such physical metrics are well suited to measure the 
impact on natural systems. Applied to systems under human management they suffer from being 
inadequately linked to human welfare, the ultimate indicator of concern. Other researchers 
recommend the use of different metrics for different types of impacts (e.g., impact on markets, 
mortality, ecosystems, quality of life and equity; see Schneider, 1997). Composite vulnerability 
profiles have been proposed but not fully implemented (e.g., Downing et al., 2001). The final 
comparison or aggregation across different metrics is then left to policy makers, as is the trade-off 
between avoided impacts and the costs of emission reduction. 
If the aim is to explicitly compare the  impacts of climate change with mitigation costs, it is 
necessary to express the benefits of mitigated climate change in the same metric as the costs of 
emission reduction, that is money (Nordhaus, 1991, 1994a; Cline, 1992; Downing et al., 1995, 
1996; Hohmeyer and Gaertner, 1992; Fankhauser, 1995; Mendelsohn and Neumann, 1999; Titus, 
1992; Tol, 1995).
1 This metric is particularly well suited to measure market impacts, that is impacts 
that are linked to market transactions and directly affect GDP (i.e. a country’s national accounts). 
The costs of sea level rise can be expressed as the capital cost of protection plus the economic value 
of land and structures at loss or at risk; and agricultural impact can be expressed as costs or benefits 
to producers and consumers. Using a monetary metric to express non-market impacts, such as 
effects on ecosystems or human health, is more difficult, though it is possible in principle. There is 
a broad and established literature on valuation theory and its application, including studies (mostly 
in a non-climate change context) on the monetary value of lower mortality risk, ecosystems, quality 
of life, etc (e.g., Freeman, 1993). But economic valuation can be controversial, and requires 
sophisticated analysis that is still mostly lacking in a climate change context (e.g., Pearce et al., 
1996). 
                                                 
1 Multicriteria analyis would be an alternative, but has yet to be applied to climate change. It should be noted, though, that difficulties in valuation are only one of many problems that plague 
impact assessments. Even greater challenges arise in relating climate change, whether impacts of 
policy effects, to issues of equity.  What if climate change increases (or reduces) income disparities, 
especially between developed and developing countries? What if an entire region collapses, such as 
semi-arid Africa? Or we no longer expect to meet international development targets, such as the 
reduction of poverty? Such challenges to our ‘moral economy’ – world views of human concerns 
and the global village – are not part of the customary analysis of impacts and policy. 
Even if it were easy and well-accepted, expressing total impacts in monetary terms is, in itself, not 
sufficient to allow a consistent comparison of the (avoided) impacts of climate change with 
mitigation costs, or to compare climate policy  to other policies, e.g. on education, public health 
care, or urban air quality.  To be able to do that one needs to gain an understanding of the impact of 
climate change at the margin, i.e. the effect that can be achieved by a small alteration in greenhouse 
gas emissions. This aspect of monetisation has not been pursued to a great extent in the literature. 
The ExternE project, from which this paper and others in this special issue greatly benefited, is 
therefore a major step forward towards an internally consistent set of marginal costs estimates for a 
range of environmental problems caused by power generation and transport. 
In the next section, we outline the main challenges and limitations of climate change impact 
research. In section 3 we discuss the literature on monetary estimates of the total (aggregate) impact 
of climate change and its distribution across population groups. Section 4 reviews the few estimates 
of the marginal damage costs of greenhouse gas emissions. Section 5 discusses the sensitivity of 
such estimates and key uncertainties, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Limitations 
Research into the economic impacts of climate change is still at a nascent stage.  
A major difficulty in impact assessment is our still incomplete understanding of climate change 
itself, in particular  the regional details of climate change (Mahlman, 1997). Impacts are local, and 
impacts are related to weather variability and extremes. Current climate change scenarios and 
current climate change impact studies use crude spatial and temporal resolutions, too crude to 
capture a number of essential details that determine the impacts. While there is a growing sense of 
the relative confidence in climate change (IPCC 2001), this has not been translated into robust risk 
assessments of impacts and their aggregate valuation. 
Knowledge gaps continue at the level of impact analysis. Despite a growing number of country-
level case studies (e.g., U.S. Country Studies Program, 1999), our knowledge of local impacts is 
still too uneven and incomplete for a careful, detailed comparison across regions. Furthermore, 
differences in assumptions often make it difficult to compare case studies across countries. Only a 
few studies try to provide a coherent global picture, based on a uniform set of assumptions. The 
basis of many such global impact assessments tend to be case studies with a more limited scope, 
often undertaken in the United States, which are then extrapolated to other regions . Such 
extrapolation is difficult and will be successful only if regional circumstances are carefully taken 
into account, including differences in geography, level of development, value systems and adaptive 
capacity. Not all analyses are equally careful in undertaking this task.  There are other shortcomings that affect the quality of analysis. While our understanding of the 
vulnerability of developed countries is improving – at least with respect to market impacts – good 
information about developing countries remains scarce. Non-market damages, indirect effects (e.g., 
the effect of changed agricultural output on the food processing industry), horizontal interlinkages 
(e.g., the interplay between water supply and agriculture; or how the loss of ecosystem functions 
will affect GDP), and the socio-political implications of change are also still poorly understood. 
Uncertainty, transient effects (the impact of a changing rather than a changed and static climate), 
and the influence of change in climate variability are other factors deserving more attention.  
Another key problem is adaptation. There has been substantial progress in the treatment of 
adaptation in recent years. However, adaptation is hard to capture adequately in an impact 
assessment. Adaptation will entail complex behavioral, technological and institutional adjustments 
at all levels of society, and not all population groups will be equally adept at adapting. Some 
adaptations reduce impacts (e.g., crop choice). Others increase climate change (e.g., air 
conditioning), or increase indirect effects (e.g., irrigation creates water stresses that may increase 
climate impacts).  The goals of adaptation are not always the same across studies. In some studies 
the (implicit) goal is to maintain current cropping patterns, others want to maintain current farmers’ 
incomes, or adjust existing practices in the most efficient manner. Different goals lead to different 
adaptation costs and different residual impacts. 
Various approaches are used to model adaptation (e.g., spatial analogues, micro-economic 
modeling), but they all either underestimate or overestimate its effectiveness and costs. The 
standard approach used in coastal impact assessment and in many agricultural models is to include 
in the analysis a limited number of ‘prominent’, but essentially arbitrarily chosen adaptations. This 
underestimates adaptive capacity because many powerful adaptations are excluded (Tol et al., 
1998). Approaches based on analogues (Mendelsohn et al., 1994, Kumar and Parikh, 1998, Darwin, 
1999) on the other hand, probably overestimate adaptive capacity because they neglect the cost of 
transition and learning, and impediments to adaptation. This is especially true for cases where 
adaptation in developed countries today is used as a proxy for worldwide adaptation to an uncertain 
future climate. A few studies model adaptation as an optimization process, in which agents trade off 
the costs and benefits of different adaptation options (Yohe et al., 1995, 1996; Fankhauser, 1994). 
In this case, the assumed behavior may be too economically rational compared to real behavior. The 
goals of adaptation are not always the same across studies. In some studies the (implicit) goal is to 
maintain current cropping patterns, others want to maintain current farmers’ incomes, or  adjust 
existing practices in the most efficient manner? Different goals lead to different adaptation costs 
and different residual impacts. 
Impact studies are largely confined to autonomous adaptation, that is, adaptations that occur without 
explicit policy intervention from the government. But in many cases governments too will embark 
on adaptation policies to avoid certain impacts of climate change, and  may start those policies well 
before critical climatic change occurs – for example, by linking climate change adaptation to other 
development and global change actions, such as on drought and desertification or biodiversity.  
The analysis is further complicated by the strong link between adaptation and other socio-economic 
trends. The world will substantially change in the future, and this will affect vulnerability to climate 
change. For example, a successful effort to roll back malaria could reduce the negative health 
effects on malaria risk. A less successful effort could introduce antibiotic-resistant parasites or 
pesticide-resistant mosquitoes, increasing vulnerability to climate change. The growing pressure on 
natural resources from unsustainable economic development is likely to exacerbate the impacts of climate change. However, if this pressure leads to improved management (e.g., water markets), 
vulnerability might decrease. Even without explicit adaptation, impact assessments therefore vary 
depending on the ‘type’ of socio-economic development expected in the future. The sensitivity of 
estimates to such baseline trends can in some cases be strong enough to reverse the sign, i.e., a 
potentially negative impact can become positive under a suitable development path or vice versa 
(Mendelsohn and Neumann, 1999).  
The need for synthesis and aggregation poses challenges with respect to the spatial and temporal 
comparison of impacts. Aggregating impacts requires an understanding of (or assumptions about) 
the relative importance of impacts in different sectors, in different regions and at different times. 
Developing this understanding implicitly involves value judgments. The task is simplified if 
impacts can be expressed in a common metric, but even then aggregation is not possible without 
value judgments. The value judgments underlying regional aggregation are discussed and made 
explicit in Azar (1999), Azar and Sterner (1996) and Fankhauser et al. (1997, 1998). Aggregation 
across time, and the issue of discounting, is discussed Arrow et al. (1996) and Weyant and Portney 
(2000). Problems in aggregating across sectors are discussed in Rothman (2000). 
Despite the limits in knowledge, a few general patterns emerge . They are derived from general 
principles, observations of past vulnerabilities, and limited modeling studies.  
 
3.  Total Impacts and Their Distribution 
A number of studies have estimated the total impact of climate change (aggregated across sectors) 
in different regions of the world. Table 1 shows aggregate, monetized impact estimates for a 
doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide on the current economy and population from the three main 
studies undertaken since the IPCC Second Assessment Report (Pearce et al., 1996), and summarises 
the ‘first generation’ of studies already reviewed in the Second Assessment Report for comparison.  
The numerical results remain speculative, but they can provide insights on signs, orders of 
magnitude, and patterns of vulnerability. Results are difficult to compare because different studies 
assume different climate scenarios, make different assumptions about adaptation, use different 
regional disaggregation and include different impacts. The Nordhaus and Boyer (1999) estimates, 
for example, are more negative than others, partly because they factor in the possibility of 
catastrophic impact. The Mendelsohn et al. (1996) and Tol (1999a) estimates, on the other hand, are 
driven by optimistic assumptions about adaptive capacity and baseline development trends, which 
results in mostly beneficial impacts. 
 
Table 1. Estimates of the regional impacts of climate change.
a 
 ‚First  Generation’  Mendelsohn  et al.  Nordhaus / Boyer 
 2.5°C 1.5°C 2.5°C  2.5°C
North America  -1.5  
   USA  -1.0 to -1.5 0.3  -0.5OECD Europe  -1.3  
   EU  -1.4   -2.8
OECD Pacific  -1.4 to -2.8  
   Japan  -0.1  -0.5
Eastern Europe & fUSSR  0.3  
   Eastern Europe    -0.7
   fUSSR  -0.7  
   Russia  11.1  0.7
Middle East  -4.1   -2.0
c
Latin America  -4.3  
   Brazil  -1.4 
South & Southeast Asia  -8.6  
   India  -2.0  -4.9
China  -4.7 to -5.2 1.8  -0.2
Africa -8.7   -3.9
DCs  0.12 0.03 
LDCs  0.05 -0.17 
World   
   output weighted  -1.5 to -2.0 0.1  -1.5
   population weighted    -1.9
   at world average prices   
   equity weighted    
a Figures are expressed as impacts on a society with today’s economic structure, population, laws etc. Mendelsohn et 
al.’s estimates denote impact on a future economy. Estimates are expressed as per cent of Gross Domestic Product. 
Positive numbers denote benefits, negative numbers denote costs.
 
b Figures in brackets denote standard deviations.  They denote a lower bound to the real uncertainty 
c high-income OPEC 
d China, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam 
Source: Pearce et al. (1996); Mendelsohn et al. (1996); Nordhaus and Boyer (2000); Tol (1999a).  
Standard deviations are rarely reported, but likely amount to several times the ‘best guess’. They are 
larger for developing countries, where results are generally derived through extrapolation rather 
than direct estimation. This is illustrated by the standard deviations estimated by Tol (1999a),  
reproduced in Table 1. Downing et al. (1996) provide a much higher range of uncertainty, from 
nearly 0 impact to almost 40% of world GDP, reflecting a much wider range of assumptions than 
are commonly included. The Tol estimates probably still underestimate the true uncertainty, for 
example because they exclude omitted impacts and severe climate change scenarios. 
Overall, the current generation of aggregate estimates may understate the true cost of climate 
change because they tend to ignore extreme weather events; underestimate the compounding effect 
of multiple stresses; and ignore the costs of transition and learning. However, studies may also have 
overlooked positive impacts of climate change and not adequately accounted for how development 
could reduce impacts of climate change. Our current understanding of (future) adaptive capacity, 
particularly in developing countries, is too limited, and the inclusion of adaptation in current studies 
too varied to allow a firm conclusion about the direction of the estimation bias. 
While our understanding of aggregate impacts remains limited, it is constantly improving. Some 
sectors and impacts have gained more analytical attention than others, and as a result are better 
understood. Agricultural and coastal impacts in particular are now well studied. Knowledge about 
the health impacts of climate change is also growing. Several attempts have been made to identify 
other non-market impacts, such as changes in aquatic and terrestrial ecological systems, and 
ecosystem services, but a clear and compatible quantification has not yet emerged. A few generic 
patterns and trends are nevertheless appearing:  
-  Market-impacts are lower than initially thought, and may be in some countries and sectors 
positive – at least in developed regions. The downward correction is largely due to the effect of 
adaptation, which is more fully (although far from perfectly) captured in the latest estimates. 
Efficient adaptation reduces the net costs of climate change because the cost of such measures is 
lower than the concomitant reduction in impacts. However, impact uncertainty and lack of 
capacity may make efficient and error-free adaptation difficult.  
-  Even so, market impacts could be significant in some conditions, such as a rapid increase in 
extreme events, which might lead to large losses and/or costly over-adaptation (for example sea 
walls to protect culturally important areas) (see Downing et al., 1998). 
-  Non-market impacts will be more pronounced than early aggregate studies conveyed, as many 
(but not all) of the effects that have not yet been quantified could be negative. In particular, 
there is concern about the impact on human health and mortality. Although few studies have 
taken adequate account of adaptation or development, the literature suggests substantial 
negative health impacts in developing countries, mainly because of insufficient basic health care 
(e.g., Martens et al., 1997; Tol and Dowlatabadi, forthcoming). There is also concern about the 
impact on water resources (e.g., Arnell, 1999) and ecosystems (e.g., White et al., 1999, 
Markham, 1996).  
-  Developing countries are more vulnerable to climate change than developed countries because 
their economies rely more heavily on climate-sensitive activities (in particular agriculture), and 
many already operate close to environmental and climatic tolerance levels (e.g., with respect to coastal and water resources). Developing countries are poorly prepared to deal with the climate 
variability and natural hazards they already face today (World Bank 2000).  If current 
development trends continue, few of them will have the financial, technical, and institutional 
capacity and knowledge base to deal with the additional stress of climate change. 
-  Differences in vulnerability will not only be observed between regions, but also within them. 
Some individuals, sectors, and systems will be less affected, or may even benefit, while other 
individuals, sectors, and systems may suffer significant losses.  There are indications that poor 
people in general, wherever they live, may be more vulnerable to climate change than the better 
to do.  Differences in adaptive capacity are again a key reason for this pattern.  
-  Estimates of global impact are sensitive to the way figures are aggregated. Because the most 
severe impacts are expected in developing countries, the more weight is assigned to developing 
countries, the more severe are aggregate impacts (see the next section). Using a simple adding 
of impacts, some studies estimate small net positive impacts at a few degrees of warming, while 
others estimate small net negative impacts.  
-  Net aggregate benefits do not preclude the possibility of a majority of people being negatively 
affected, and some population groups severely so. This  is due to the fact that developed 
economies, many of which could have positive impacts, contribute the majority of global 
production but account for a smaller fraction of world population.  However, there are no 
studies so far that have consistently estimated the total number of people negatively affected by 
climate change.  
Most impact studies assess the consequences of climate change at a particular concentration level or 
a particular point in time, thus providing a static “snap shot” of an evolving, dynamic process. One 
of the main challenges of impact assessments is to move from this static analysis  to a dynamic 
representation of impacts as a function of shifting climate characteristics, adaptation measures and 
exogenous trends like economic and population growth. Little progress has been made in this 
respect, and our understanding of the time path aggregate impacts will follow under different 
warming and development scenarios, is still extremely limited. Among the few explicitly dynamic 
analyses are Sohngren and Mendelsohn (1999), Tol and Dowlatabadi (forthcoming) and Yohe et al. 
(1996).  
Dynamic studies remain highly speculative at this point, as the underlying models only provide a 
very rough reflection of real-world complexities. Figure 1 shows examples from three studies. 
While some analysts still work with relatively smooth impact functions (e.g. Nordhaus and Boyer 
2000), there is growing recognition (e.g., Tol. 1999b; Mendelsohn and Schlesinger 1999) that the 
climate impact dynamics – the conjunction of climate change, societal change, impact, and 
adaptation – is certainly not linear, and might be quite complex. 
Impacts in different sectors may unfold along fundamentally different paths. Coastal impacts, for 
example, are expected to grow continuously over time, more or less in proportion to the rise in sea 
level. The prospects for agriculture, in contrast, are more diverse. While some models predict 
aggregate damages already for moderate warming, many studies suggest that under some (but not 
all) scenarios the impact curve might be hump-shaped, with short-term (aggregate) benefits under 
modest climate change turning into losses under more substantial change (e.g., Mendelsohn and 
Schlesinger 1999). 
  
Figure 1. The impact of climate change as a function of the global mean temperature, according to 
Mendelsohn et al. (1996), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), and Tol (1999a,b). Mendelsohn et al. 
aggregate impacts across different regions weighted by regional output. Nordhaus and Boyer 
aggregate either weighted by regional output or weighted by regional population. Tol aggregates 
either by regional output or by equity, that is, by the ratio of world per capita income to regional per 
capita income. 
4. Marginal cost estimates 
The marginal damages caused by a metric ton of carbon dioxide emissions in the near future were 
estimated in the Second Assessment Report at US$5 – 125 per tC. Most estimates are in the lower 
part of that range, and higher estimates only occur through the combination of a high vulnerability 
with a low discount rate (see Pearce et al., 1996). Plambeck and Hope (1996), Eyre et al. (1997), 
Tol (1999c) and Tol and Downing (2000) have since reassessed the marginal damage costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Performing extensive sensitivity and uncertainty analyses, they arrive at 
essentially the same range of numbers as do Pearce et al. (1996). 
Table 2 reproduces some estimates. The first four studies were also reported in Pearce et al. (1996). 
Most estimates are in the range $5-20/tC, but higher estimates cannot be excluded. The uncertainty 
about the marginal damage costs is right-skewed, so the mean is higher than the best guess, and 
nasty surprises are more likely than pleasant surprises. 
More recent studies reported by Eyre et al. (1999 – here represented by Tol, 1999c, and Downing’s 
estimates in Tol and Downing, 2000) basically confirm the earlier numbers, but also point out that 
the marginal damage cost estimate is extremely sensitive to the discount rate. 
The alternative estimate of Tol (1999c) uses equity weighting, an aggregation procedure that takes 










































Tol, equity1997, 1998). Equity weighting puts more emphasis on the impacts in developing countries, so the 
marginal damage cost estimate is considerably higher. 
All the studies in Table 2 are based on what we called the ‘first generation’ of studies of total 
economic impacts , except the Tol estimate in Tol and Downing (2000). This last study uses more 
optimistic,  estimates of the impact of climate change (cf. Table 1). Consequently, the marginal 
damage costs are low and, for a high discount rate, may even be negative (i.e. marginal benefits).  
Table 2. Estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in $/tC) 
Stud\PRTP
a  0% 1% 3%
Nordhaus (1994a) 
- Best guess  5
- Expected value  12
Peck and Teisberg (1992)  10-12
Fankhauser (1994)
b  20 (6-45) 
Cline (1992, 1993)  6-124 







Tol and  20 4 -7
Downing (2000)
d  75 46 16
Tol (1999c)
e 
- Best guess  73 23 9
- Equity weighted  171 60 26
a Pure rate of time preference, or utility discount rate. The more conventional consumption, or money discount rate 
equals the utility discount rate plus the growth rate of per capita income. 
b Expected value, uncertainty about the discount rate included. 
c Plambeck and Hope (1996) use pure rates of time preference of 0, 2% and 3%. The range is the 95% confidence 
interval (parametric uncertainty only). 
d Tol and Downing (2000) report estimates from Tol’s FUND model (top line) and from Downing’s Open Framework 
model (bottom line). 
e Tol uses consumption discount rates of 1%, 3% and 5%; the assumed per capita income growth is roughly 2%.  
 
Estimates of the marginal costs of other greenhouse gases are fewer. Table 3 displays some 
estimates for methane (CH4) and Table 4 for nitrous oxide (N2O). Table 5 displays the ratio of the 
marginal costs of both gases to the marginal costs of carbon dioxide. Table 3. Estimates of the marginal damage costs of methane emissions (in $/tCH4) 
Study\PRTP
a  0% 1% 3%
Fankhauser (1994)
b  108 (48-205) 
Tol and  -90 -117 -119
Downing (2000)
c  256 233 139
Tol (1999c)
d 
- Best guess  141 89 52
- Equity weighted  517 295 170
a Pure rate of time preference, or utility discount rate. The more conventional consumption, or money discount rate 
equals the utility discount rate plus the growth rate of per capita income. 
b Expected value, uncertainty about the discount rate included. 
c Tol and Downing (2000) report estimates from Tol’s FUND model (top line) and from Downing’s Open Framework 
model (bottom line). 
d Tol uses consumption discount rates of 1%, 3% and 5%; the assumed per capita income growth is roughly 2%.  
 
Table 4. Estimates of the marginal damage costs of nitrous oxide emissions (in $/tN2O) 
Study\PRTP
a  0% 1% 3%
Fankhauser (1994)
b  2895 (805-7235) 
Tol and  2351 782 -270
Downing (2000)
c  11385 6636 2078
Tol (1999c)
d 
- Best guess  7559 2201 817
- Equity weighted  16862 5459 2217
a Pure rate of time preference, or utility discount rate. The more conventional consumption, or money discount rate 
equals the utility discount rate plus the growth rate of per capita income. 
b Expected value, uncertainty about the discount rate included. 
c Tol and Downing (2000) report estimates from Tol’s FUND model (top line) and from Downing’s Open Framework 
model (bottom line). 
d Tol uses consumption discount rates of 1%, 3% and 5%; the assumed per capita income growth is roughly 2%.  
 




c   Kandlikar
d   Fankhauser
d   Hammitt
f   GWP
g 
CH4 14  -122  19   12    20   11    25 
N2O 348  818  531   282    333   355    320 
a  Emissions between 1995 and 2004; time horizon: 2100; consumption discount rate: 3%; model: FUND1.6; scenario: 
IS92a; simple sum; no higher order effects. 
b  Emissions between 1995 and 2004; time horizon: 2100; utility discount rate: 1%; model: FUND2.0; scenario IS92a; 
simple sum; no higher order effects. 
c  Emissions between 1995 and 2004; time horizon: 2100; utility discount rate: 1%; model: Open Framework; scenario 
IS92a; simple sum; no higher order effects. 
d  Time horizon: 100 years; discount rate: 2%; scenario: IS92a; quadratic damages. 
e  Emissions between 1991 and 2000; time horizon: 2100; GDP is calculated as ratio of mean marginal damages. 
f  Emissions in 1995; time horizon: 2100; discount rate: 3%; scenario: IS92a; middle case. 
g  Gobal warming potential; time horizon: 100 years. 
Sources: Tol (1999c), Tol and Downing (2000), Kandlikar (1995, 1996), Fankhauser (1995), Hammitt et al. (1996), 
Schimel et al. (1996). 
 
Roughly, the ratio of the marginal cost of N2O to CO2 equals the Global Warming Potentials (GWP) 
of nitrous oxide. This is no real surprise, as the two gases have similar lifetimes so that discounting 
has the same effect on the nominator and the denominator. For the same reason, the ratio of 
marginal costs of short-lived methane to carbon dioxide differs from the GWP of methane, and 
according to some studies by a whole lot. 
It should be noted that the marginal cost ratios (and to some extent the global warming potentials) 
reflect a cost-benefit perspective on climate policy. National and international climate policy 
apparently favours a cost-effectiveness approach, that is, an emission reduction strategy that meets a 
given target at the lowest possible cost. From a cost-effectiveness perspective, the appropriate trade-
off between gases is the ratio of the marginal reduction costs, or the shadow prices of the respective 
constraints. Manne and Richels (2000) and Tol et al. (forthcoming) show that this ratio is also very 
different from the GPW, particularly in the case of methane. Methane is so short-lived in the 
atmosphere that near-term emission reduction hardly contributes to long-term goals of atmospheric 
stabilization. 
 
5.  Discussion: Sensitivity of marginal cost estimates to methodological assumptions 
Estimates of the marginal costs of climate change are perhaps even more uncertain than those about 
total impacts.  At a time when the quality of numerical results is still low, a key benefit of impact 
analysis lies in the insights it provides on the sensitivity of results. Sensitivity analysis offers critical 
information about the attributes of the damage function likely to be most influential to the choice of 
policy, and – by implication – where additional climate change impacts research is most needed. 
Inclusion and metric 
Most aggregate and marginal analyses are based on integrated assessment models. The impact 
functions used in integrated assessment models vary greatly with respect to the level of modeling 
sophistication, the degree of regional aggregation, the choice of indicator and other characteristics. Many models have used monetary terms, e.g., dollars, to measure impacts. The spatially detailed 
models (e.g., Alcamo, 1994) pay some attention to unique ecosystems. Large-scale disruptive 
climate changes have received little attention, except for a survey of expert opinions (Nordhaus, 
1994b) and analytical work (e.g., Gjerde et al., 1998). Some climate change impact studies restrict 
themselves to sectors and countries that are relatively well-studied (e.g., Mendelsohn and Neumann, 
1999). Others try to be comprehensive, despite the additional uncertainties (e.g., Hohmeyer and 
Gaertner, 1992). Most studies are somewhere in the middle (see Tol and Fankhauser, 1998). Some 
studies rely on an aggregate description of all climate change impacts for the world as a whole (e.g., 
Nordhaus, 1994a). Other studies disaggregate impacts with substantial spatial detail (e.g., Alcamo, 
1994), but sacrifice the quality and amount of input data.  
Aggregation 
When results are aggregated, i.e., combining the winners (e.g., agriculture in northern Europe) with 
the losers (e.g., sea level rise in the Maldives), a mildly negative or mildly positive impact can result 
and geographic variation is typically lost. In a previous ExternE project (Eyre et al., 1998), 
Downing and Tol investigated the effect of regional aggregation. At the country level, there are 
many more countries that are winners or losers, and by a larger amount, than implied by region-
average calculations.  For example, half of the OECD European countries have net benefits, and 
half have net costs.  The total of the benefits for all countries with benefits is three times greater 
than the total of the benefits calculated at the regional level.  Similarly, the total of the costs for 
countries with net costs is some 25% greater than the net costs calculated at the regional level.  
Thus, regional aggregation may hide some of the extreme impacts (both beneficial and adverse) and 
imply transfers of welfare between countries. 
Equity and welfare 
More detailed analyses stress the distributional consequences of climate change. The highly 
aggregated approaches tend to point out implications for efficiency, and in practice often ignore 
equity (see Tol, forthcoming, for an exception). The detailed approaches tend to identify issues 
regarding equity, although that justice interpretation is typically left to the reader. The equity-
weighting scheme reported in Table 1 is fairly simple – and one could argue would be acceptable to 
most analysts.  Similar estimates with and without weighting are some three-fold greater. Studies 
that would include macro-scale discontinuities, would stress precaution. 
The comparison of impacts, i.e., the relative weight assigned to impacts in different regions and at 
different times, is one of the most sensitive aspects of aggregate analysis. With the exception of the 
discount rate, little explicit attention is paid to this aspect of climate change impacts, although 
studies differ considerably in their implicit assumptions. Fankhauser et al. (1997) and Azar (1999) 
are among the few studies to make their aggregation assumptions explicit. They find that, in 
general, the more weight one puts on the distribution of the impacts of climate change, the more 
severe are the aggregate impacts. Fankhauser’s (1995) estimate of the annual global damage of 
2xCO2, for instance, is based on the implicit assumption that people are neutral with respect to 
distribution (that is, losses to the poor can be compensated by equal gains to the rich) and risk (that 
is, a 1:1,000,000 change of losing $1 million is equivalent to losing $1 for certain). Replacing these 
assumptions with either standard risk-aversion or mild inequity-aversion, the global damage 
estimate increases by about a third (Fankhauser et al., 1997). Marginal impacts are more sensitive. 
For the same changes in assumptions, Tol (1999c) finds a three-fold increase in the marginal damage estimate. See Table 2. The sensitivity of aggregate impact estimates is further illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Shape of the damage function 
Most impact studies still look at the equilibrium effect of one particular level of greenhouse gas 
concentrations, usually 2xCO2. A full, transient analysis, however, requires impacts to be expressed 
as a function of change in greenhouse gas concentrations.
2 With so little information to estimate 
such functions, studies have to rely on sensitivity analyses. The policy implications can be 
profound. Compare, for example, the profile of impacts under a linear and a cubic damage function. 
Relative to the linear specification, a cubic function implies low near-term impacts, but rapidly 
increasing impacts further in the future. Using conventional discounting, this means that early 
emissions under a cubic damage function will cause less damage over their atmospheric lifetime, 
compared to a scenario with linear damages. The marginal damage caused by emissions further in 
the future, on the other hand, is much higher if we assume a cubic damage function (Peck and 
Teisberg, 1994).  
Manne and Richels (1995) use a ‘hockey-stick’ function, with relatively small impacts before 
2xCO2 and rapidly worsening impacts beyond 2xCO2. In this analysis, it is economically efficient to 
stabilize carbon dioxide concentrations. The stabilization level depends on the shape of the hockey 
stick. Other cost-benefit analyses, assuming lower climate change impact in the long run, have 
difficulty justifying concentration stabilization at any level.  
The Rate of Change 
Although most impact studies focus on the level of climate change, the rate of climate change is 
generally believed to be an important determinant in many instances because it affects the time 
available for adaptation. Again, the paucity of underlying impact studies forces integrated assessors 
to use exploratory modeling. Under most business as usual scenarios, the rate of climate change is 
larger in the short run than in the long run because emissions increase faster in the short run; this is 
even more pronounced in emission reduction policy scenarios. Indeed, if considering the rate of 
change, both tolerable window and safe corridor analyses (Toth et al., 1997; Petschel-Held et al., 
1999; Alcamo and Kreileman, 1996) often find the rate of change to be the binding constraint in the 
next few decades. 
Discount Rate and Time Horizon 
Aggregate models suggest that the most severe impacts of climate change will occur further in the 
future. The chance of large-scale discontinuities (e.g., the collapse of the thermohaline circulation or 
the West-Antarctic ice sheet) is also higher in the future. The outcome of policy analysis is therefore 
sensitive to the weight afforded to events occurring in the remote future. In other words, estimates 
are sensitive to the choice of time horizon (Azar and Sterner, 1996; Cline, 1992 Hasselmann et al., 
1997) and the discount rate, i.e., the value of future consumption relative to today’s.  The literature 
on discounting is reviewed in Markandya et al. (2001 and Portney and Weyant (1999). Numerical 
analysis (e.g., Tol 1999c) has shown that estimates of marginal damage can vary by as much as a 
factor ten for different (and reasonable) assumptions about the discount rate. This makes the 
discount rate the second-most important determinant for the marginal damage (see Table 2), behind 
                                                 




The economic impact of climate change is a hard subject to study. Current methodologies are weak, 
and uncertainties remain large. Nonetheless, we draw four conclusions can be drawn with some 
confidence. 
First, vulnerabilities differ considerably between regions. Poorer countries would face 
proportionally higher negative impacts than richer countries.  
Second, (sustainable) development may reduce overall vulnerability to climate change, as richer 
societies tend to be better able to adapt and their economies are less dependent on climate. But it is 
not known whether development will be fast enough to reduce poorer countries’ vulnerability in 
time. Delays in reducing climate impacts could affect achievement of sustainable development 
targets. 
Third, the impacts of moderate global warming (say, up to 2-3°C in 2100) are mixed. Poorer 
countries are likely to be net losers, richer countries (especially in mid- to northern latitudes) may 
gain from moderate warming. The global picture depends on how one aggregates. If aggregation is 
on a dollar  basis, the world as a whole may win a bit. If aggregation is based on people, the world 
as a whole may lose. In addition, impacts to natural ecosystems could be negative even at these 
levels of warming. 
Fourth, the impacts of more substantial global warming (more than 2-3°C or sooner than 2100) are 
probably negative, and increasingly so for higher or faster warming. This holds for the majority of 
countries. Note that, because of the slow rate of change in the energy sector and the atmosphere, we 
are probably already committed to at least 2°C of warming. 
It may be helpful to relate emerging relative confidence in climate change with our sense of 
progress in valuing climate change damages (see Figure XX).  Some climatic changes can be 
predicted with relatively high confidence—global and regional warming, sea level rise and rising 
CO2 concentrations.  These changes will affect, among other things, agroclimatic suitability, heat 
stress and demand for water.  Less confidence is ascribed to changes in storm- and water-related 
effects: precipitation, precipitation intensity, wind speeds, sunshine, etc.  However, the range of 
scenarios generally fall within defined limits, leading to modest confidence in expected impacts on 
crop production, water systems and other resources.  Low confidence is likely to continue for some 
time in our ability to project changes in the risk of extreme events (prolonged drought, intense 
cyclones, etc.) and large-scale changes such as collapse of major ice sheets.  We have indicated 
above that confidence is higher in valuation of market impacts than non-market impacts, and equity 
and welfare effects are especially contentious. 
What can we then conclude about the conjunction of confidence in climate change and the valuation 
of impacts (not ignoring uncertainties in GHG emissions and impacts science as well)?  It does not 
take too much imagination to reach very large damages, but they require incorporating relatively 
uncertain climate changes and impacts, and the kinds of valuations of ecological and human 
systems that are not customary in present assessment models – that is the lower and right-hand cells in the table.  On the other hand, we have relatively high confidence that the market-impacts of some 
trends in the climate system will have benefits in some regions and sectors (e.g., northern 
agriculture) and costs in others (e.g., coastal habitation in vulnerable deltas).  In between these two 
poles, where climate futures are at best uncertain risks and valuation of non-market impacts is 
poorly understood, remains a fruitful research frontier. 
Overall, there is a clear economic rationale for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. By how much, 
where and when cannot be answered without also considering the costs of emission reduction. One 
needs to compare the marginal damage costs of climate change to the marginal costs of emission 
reduction . The marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions are uncertain, but the current 
literature suggests that estimates in excess of  $50/tC require relatively unlikely scenarios of climate 
change, impact sensitivity and economic values. 
This does not mean that emission reduction targets can be determined based on a simple cost-
benefit test. The distribution of impacts, risks, and uncertainty also need to be factored into the 
analysis. While relatively  little about climate change impacts is known with certainty, today’s 
policy makers are not required to make once-for-all decisions binding their successors over the next 
century. There will be ample opportunities for mid-course adjustments. Climate negotiations are 
best viewed as an ongoing process of "act-then learn". Today's decisions makers must aim at 
evolving an acceptable hedging strategy -- one that balances the risks of premature actions against 
those of waiting too long.  
The first step is to determine the sensitivity of today's decisions to major uncertainties in the 
greenhouse debate. How important is it to know what energy demands will be in thirty years? To 
identify the technologies that will be in place to meet those demands? Or to be able to predict 
damages for the second half of the next century. An exhaustive analysis of these questions has yet 
to me undertaken, but considerable insight can be gleaned from an Energy Modeling Forum Study 
conducted several years ago (EMF-14, 1997). In the study, seven modeling teams addressed a key 
consideration in climate policy making: concerns about low probability but high consequence 
events. 
The study assumed that uncertainty would not be resolved until 2020. Two parameters were varied: 
the mean temperature sensitivity factor and the cost of damages associated with climate change and 
variability. The unfavorable high consequence scenario was defined as the top 5 percent of each of 
these two distributions. Two surveys of expert opinion were used for choosing the distribution of 
these variables.  
The analysis showed that the degree of hedging is dependent on the stakes, the odds, society’s 
attitude towards risk and the cost of greenhouse insurance. Also critical is the timing of the 
resolution of key uncertainties The longer it takes to resolve uncertainty, the greater the need for 
precautionary action.  This underscores the importance of scientific research among the portfolio of 
options for dealing with climate change.  
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